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Abstract
We show how introducing a time discount factor can strengthen some results given in
[Soubeyran R. (2006) "When Inertia Generates Political Cycles," Economics Bulletin, Vol. 4
no. 31 pp. 1-8.].
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In a recent article, [Soubeyran, 2006] showed that political cycles can
occur when there is some inertia in the government policy. In this model lies
an important and unsaid assumption: voters are myopic or have a null per
period discount rate. In this remark, we show that, with three voters, there
are cases where [Soubeyran, 2006]’s model shows no cycle whereas adding a
non-null per period discount rate leads to some cycles. Then, when voters
take the future into account, the possibility of seeing political cycles is greater.
This strengthens the results obtained in [Soubeyran, 2006].
2 The model
We consider a society composed of three individuals, {L,R,m}. The
reason why we consider only three individuals is explained in the end of
the article. The set of policies is the interval P = [−1,1]. Each individual
i ∈ N is represented by a bliss point αi in the set of policies. For the sake of
simplicity, we will set αL = −1 and αR = 1.1 The society needs to choose a
policy at each period of time between 1 and inﬁnity. For this purpose, each
individual i casts a vote ωi{L,R} at each period between 1 and inﬁnity. The
policy implemented in t = 0 is exogenous and ﬁxed to p0. At each period of
time, the candidate receiving the greatest number of votes, W(t) ∈ {L,R}
is elected. The elected individual in period t implements his favorite policy
but because of some inertia between periods, the actual eﬀective policy, pt is
given by
pt = (1 − δ)α
W(t) + δpt−1,
where δ is the inertia parameter. If δ = 0, there is no inertia and the
eﬀective policy is exactly the one implemented by the elected candidate. On
the contrary, if δ = 1, there is a full correlation between the policies and the
elected candidate has no inﬂuence.





T−t | pt − α
i |,
where β ∈ [0,1] is the per period time discount rate.
1Notice that by imposing αL = −1 and αR = 1, we make sure that even in presence
of inertia, candidates L and R will implement policies corresponding to their respective
bliss points if elected. They have no mean to compensate for the inertia by behaving more
extremist than they actually are. This possibility is not considered in [Soubeyran, 2006].
1Finally, we will say that there are political cycles for the set of parameters
(β,δ,p0,αm) if and only if W(t) does not converge when t goes to inﬁnity.
Obviously, citizen-candidates L and R will always vote for themselves.
Hence, citizen m will always be the median voter. Therefore, the following
proposition given in [Soubeyran, 2006] can be stated in our framework.
Proposition 1











When the problem is set with β  = 0, we have a dynamical optimization
problem. Then, we can set the value function giving the intertemporal utility
of individual m as a function of the current policy p.
V (p) = − | p − α
m | +β max
i∈{−1;1}
V (δp + i(1 − δ)). (1)
This function is tricky to obtain analytically. We will rather computa-
tionally estimate it. We show in Figure 1 the value function V (p) for δ = 0.5,
β = 0.85 and αm = 0.6.2
From the function V (p) we can infer the votes of individual m. When β =
0.85 and αm = 0.6 (case shown in Figure 1), we can state that individual m
votes for R when p ≤ 0.8933 whereas he votes for L when p ≥ 0.8933. Then,
there is necessarily a political cycle for the set of parameters (β = 0.85,δ =
0.5,p0,αm = 0.6) and any p0 ∈ P. Notice that according to Proposition 1,
there is no cycle for the set of parameters (β = 0,δ = 0.5,p0,αm = 0.6) and
any p0 ∈ P. Then, the possibility of a cycle is introduced by considering a
non-null time discount rate.
In ﬁgure 2, we show the votes at any policy p as a function of αm for
δ = 0.5, β = 0 and β = 0.85. In all the cases we observed, the areas where
individual m votes for R and L are compact. In these cases, obviously, there
are no political cycles if and only if for any p, the vote is the same, R or
L. For instance, when β = 0.85, there are political cycles if and only if
αm ∈ [−0.69,0.69]. When β = 0, there are political cycles if and only if
αm ∈ [−0.5,0.5] as is shown by Figure 2 and as was stated by Proposition 1.
Then, in Figure 3, we can show the values of αm as a function of β for
which there are political cycles.
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Figure 2: Votes at p as a function of αm when δ = 0.5 (both lines) and


















Figure 3: Political cycles as a function of αm and β with δ ∈ {0.2,0.5,0.8}.
4 Conclusion
Then, we showed that considering a non-null time discount rate strength-
ens the results obtained in [Soubeyran, 2006] in the sense that the set of
cases where inertia leads to some cycles is greater when the time discount
rate increases.
Finally, let us study one of our crucial assumptions. We imposed that
the cardinality of the set of individuals be equal to three. Of course, if there
are less than three individuals, the problem is degenerate. On the contrary,
if there are more than three individuals, Equation 1 which is the basis of
our study, is not the one describing how citizen would vote. This equation
is satisﬁed with three individuals only because, since L and R always vote
for themselves, individual m knows that he will always be the median voter.
On the contrary, with more than three individuals, each of them should
anticipate the path of votes in the future to know if they would vote for R
or L. It is not clear if this would lead the social vote to be equal to the vote
of the median voter. This is why, we restricted our study to the case with
three individuals.
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